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Abstract: 
The macroeconomic literature on automatic stabilization tends to focus on taxes and dismiss 
the relevance of government expenditure, aside from unemployment compensation. Our re-
sults go sharply contrary to this view. We engage in an empirical analysis of 20 OECD coun-
tries from 1980-2001 and find that age- and health-related social expenditure as well as inca-
pacity benefits all react to the cycle in a stabilizing manner.  While possibly new in the macro 
literature, this conforms to many results in studies of labor and health. Moreover, when the 
focus is on the ratio of the net surplus to output, automatic stabilization comes essentially 
from the spending side. Taxes contribute nothing at all.  
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I. Introduction
The macroeconomic literature on automatic stabilization tends to focus on taxes and to 
dismiss the relevance of any government spending besides unemployment compensation. In 
this study, we combine information from the OECD Economic Outlook database with the 
OECD social expenditure database to examine the cyclical responsiveness of government 
expenditure on health, and social expenditure on retirement benefits, incapacity benefits and 
sick pay as well as unemployment compensation.1  The results, covering 20 OECD countries 
from 1980 through 2001, go sharply contrary to the idea that unemployment compensation is 
the sole social expenditure that responds to the cycle. Expenditures on health, retirement and 
incapacity also react prominently to the cycle. Furthermore, these spending categories do so 
in a stabilizing manner. Thus they enhance total automatic stabilization. In addition, the rele-
vant issue in analyzing fiscal policy is often the ratio of the net government surplus to output, 
measured or potential, rather than the level of the surplus. When the ratio is at issue, it is 
proper to estimate the cyclical impact on the ratio directly rather than to infer it from separate 
estimates of the level of the surplus and output. In that case, not only does automatic stabiliza-
tion show up as coming essentially from the spending side rather than the tax one, but most of 
the stabilization operates through social expenditure. The stabilizing behavior comes from 
sick pay as well as the other categories of social expenditure.  
Upon checking, we found the focus on taxes in discussing automatic stabilization to 
pervade the textbook literature in macroeconomics. There may be an occasional vague refer-
ence to counter-cyclical income support coming from other government spending besides 
unemployment compensation. But with the outstanding exception of Hall and Taylor (1991, 
chapter 13, which subsequently became Hall and Pappell (2005), chapter 13), unemployment 
compensation is the only spending item that receives mention. The textbooks are not misrep-
resentative. In defending the exclusive consideration of unemployment compensation as a 
counter-cyclical spending category (except for small items like food stamps), Auerbach and 
Feenberg (2000), for example, say: The logic is straightforward: discretionary spending is, 
after all, discretionary, not automatic, and interest payments and the most important manda-
tory spending programs, Social Security and Medicare, are based on longer-term factors (p. 
52). Likewise, Gali and Perotti (2003) maintain: Among primary expenditures [apart from 
interest payments], only unemployment benefits probably have a non-negligible built-in re-
                                                 
1 Melitz (2006) relied exclusively on the OECD national income database in earlier related work. 
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sponse to output fluctuations. Perotti (2002) is more explicit: Items like old age, disability 
and incapacity pensions  the bulk of transfers to households  do not have built-in mecha-
nisms that make them respond automatically to changes in employment or output contempo-
raneously. Unemployment compensation obviously does.   
Since we find that the facts clash with these assertions, a fair question to ask at the 
start is whether evidence from more specialized fields supports the ruling macroeconomic 
stand in opposition to us. On the contrary, such evidence goes our way. This line of investiga-
tion soon brings to light considerable material  particularly in the field of labor  indicating 
that retirement, sickness benefits and incapacity-related benefits vary systematically with the 
cycle. Rebick (1994) offers evidence that new recipients of social security rise during reces-
sions and fall during expansions in Sweden and Japan. Darby, Hart and Vecchi (2001) report 
a significant impact of the cycle on labor participation rates for both sexes, especially in the 
age group over 54 in France, Japan, Sweden and the US. Blanchard and Diamond (1990) 
similarly show that following a negative output shock, the highest response in movement of 
workers from employment to non-employment comes from teenagers and from people over 
65 in the US. Since retirement decisions by workers are long-term, these results would also 
suggest that demand-side factors are probably as important, if not more so, as supply ones in 
explaining the responses.2 In conformity, Hutchens (1999) has recently shown that firms have 
strong incentives to encourage early retirement and to lay off older workers during recessions 
in many Western countries on the basis of the structure of payroll taxes, contributions to 
health insurance, private pension plans and social security systems. Since Hutchens wrote, 
Coile and Levine (2006) and Hakola and Utusitalo (2005) have confirmed the importance of 
firm behavior in explaining the counter-cyclical movement of retirements in the US and 
Finland, for example. All of these results accord with our cross-country findings.3
In the case of sick pay and incapacity pay, in fact, the evidence from detailed studies 
flies off in both directions. On the one hand, there is a literature showing an inverse relation-
ship between rates of absenteeism and rates of unemployment, which has been interpreted to 
mean that absenteeism is pro-cyclical (see Leigh (1985), Boone and van Ours (2002), and 
                                                 
2 The point needs to be made since, from a strict supply perspective, utility-maximizing workers 
might postpone retirement only moderately during expansions because of the long run nature of their 
decisions (see Mitchell and Fields (1984) and Haveman and Wolfe (1984)).  
3 It should also be noted that mere differences in the average age of retirement during expansions and 
contractions would suffice to explain the counter-cyclical behavior of pensions in our results without 
any movement of individuals in and out of retirement.  
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Khan, Gerdtham and Jansson (2004) and Kaivento (1997) for more references, and see also 
Barmby, Ercolani and Treble (2002) for general cross-country evidence on sickness absence). 
The supporting theoretical arguments say that when times are bad, shirking is dangerous. Vul-
nerable workers  those on temporary contracts or with a history of health problems  will be 
particularly loath to report sick (see Arai and Skogman Thoursie (2005) and Barmby, Erco-
lani and Treble (2004)). When times are good, people are able to report sick with less fear of 
unemployment. In these times, people with permanent health problems also have less diffi-
culty holding down a job. Furthermore, since the pace of work is greater, there may be more 
work accidents, especially in dangerous industries. On the other hand, the opposing view 
maintains that sick pay, incapacity pay and unemployment compensation all move together 
over the cycle. In this case, the argument is that when layoffs rise during recessions, the peo-
ple with a choice between declaring illness, incapacity or unemployment and who can transit 
from one status to another, will base their decision on the rate and the duration of replacement 
of wages through social benefits. Thus, more people with health problems will report ill and 
incapacitated during bad times.  The supporting evidence for this other view also comes 
mostly from studies comparing performance in depressed regions relative to prospering ones 
within the same country. McVicar (2006) provides a useful review article. The literature on 
this side of the fence tends to emphasize the fact that changes in social legislation over the 
last 30 years or more have facilitated the ability to claim sick leave or disability pay. Accord-
ingly, the percentages of the labor force on sick pay or incapacity pay have risen secularly in 
the West even though health has not declined. See Bound and Burkhauser (1999) and Beatty, 
Fothergill and Macmillan (2000) (who speak of the hidden sick). Our results favor this last 
interpretation or the stabilizing cyclical behavior for incapacity pay but they are ambivalent 
about sick pay.  
There is an important methodological issue at hand. The part of the literature arguing a 
pro-cyclical movement of sick pay commonly treats the rate of unemployment as the variable 
reflecting the cycle. Leigh (1985) does so in explaining the behavior of absenteeism; Boone 
and van Ours (2002) do so too in explaining that of incapacity pay; and Khan, Gerdtham and 
Jansson (2004) do the same in explaining both sick pay and incapacity pay. But both theory 
and evidence show that the numbers of the unemployed, recipients of sick pay and recipients 
of incapacity pay are determined simultaneously. In this connection, Black, Daniel and Sand-
ers (2002) and Autor and Duggan (2003) are important in providing detailed analyses of the 
impact of the disability program in the US on the long term rate of unemployment in the 
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country. See also Beatty, Fothergill and Macmillan (2000) and Holmlund (2004) for related 
theoretical discussion. Thus, there is a considerable objection to treating unemployment as the 
measure of the cycle in explaining illness and disability pay. The treatment poses a simultane-
ity problem, and this is all the more true if, as in the relevant literature, the level rather than 
the first difference of unemployment serves as the measure of the cycle. We shall take our 
measure of the cycle to be the output gap or the ratio of output to potential output (an alterna-
tive measure of the gap) rather than the unemployment rate. We shall also use the first differ-
ence rather than the level, and we will also take other steps to respond to the problem of si-
multaneity in our analysis.   
The response of direct government spending on health to the cycle is a separate sub-
ject, on which, interestingly enough, there has been little research thus far. This neglect  at 
least in the labor literature  is probably related to the fact that eligibility for public health 
insurance is rather loosely tied to the performance of the labor market except over long 
stretches of time. The eligibility for such government insurance usually depends on little more 
a personal history of employment. Notwithstanding, if health care is cyclical, government 
spending on health will probably be so too. The issue is extremely important since govern-
ment spending on health is big. It amounts to about 6% of GDP and 13% of total government 
spending on average in our 20-country OECD sample. Intuitively, there are many reasons 
why recessions may have detrimental health effects for those losing jobs or in fear of losing 
jobs, largely for socio-psychological reasons (see for example Neumayer (2005)). But while 
the impact of the cycle on health care or health spending has attracted little attention, there is 
an active literature on the impact of the cycle on health as such, and not in labor economics 
but health economics and public health.4 In fact, this literature goes contrary to the previous 
intuition: it says that health is counter-cyclical and worsens during booms (Ruhm (2000, 
2001, 2003, 2005a,b, 2006), Gerdtham and Ruhm (2006), Ruhm and Black (2002), Tapia 
Granados (2005a,b)). Of course, the relevant studies concern the impact of the cycle on the 
total population, whereas the unemployed and the precariously employed only form a minor-
ity in all phases of the cycle. This is a key factor. Accordingly, the proposed reasons for 
worsening health during expansions are longer working hours, job-related stress, less physical 
activity, less sleep, and the direct effects of some physically dangerous work activities as well 
as greater consumption of health-damaging goods (tobacco, alcohol and saturated fats). The 
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typical measure of health in these studies is also mortality  mortality at different ages from 
different causes (including crime and traffic accidents). But of course, movements in govern-
ment spending on health could widely differ from movements in health since the spending 
depends on health care, which though clearly related to health is not the same. Much health 
care can be postponed. Even if people are healthier on average in recessions, the lower value 
of leisure at these times could lead to more health care, particularly in case of coverage by 
health insurance. Indeed, the extra health care when time is cheaper could be an additional 
reason for better health during recessions.5 Obviously this reasoning stresses substitution be-
tween work time and health care. Our results go in this counter-cyclical direction.6
 Overall, we find that the extent of automatic stabilization through all elements of so-
cial expenditure is about 3.5 times larger than the part coming from unemployment compen-
sation alone.  Every dollar of an output gap yields around 4 cents of unemployment compen-
sation in our 20-country OECD panel.  But there is also 10 cents of additional social spending 
on health, retirement, and incapacity benefits. Moreover, either health spending or retirement 
benefits alone is as important as unemployment compensation. When we conduct the study in 
ratios, we find that social spending contributes 4 to 5 times more to automatic stabilization 
than unemployment compensation. A one percent rise in the output gap increases social 
spending by around 22 percent of the rise while unemployment compensation contributes 
nearly 5 percentage points to the 22. The rest comes from sickness benefits as well as the pre-
vious sources. Incapacity benefits and sickness benefits together add nearly as much to stabi-
lization as unemployment compensation. But health is more important than unemployment 
compensation, and pensions are the most important of all, accounting for over a third of the 
entire response of social spending. 
 With regard to automatic stabilization, all things considered, our results imply larger 
numbers than before. The usual estimates of aggregate automatic stabilization in the OECD 
run around .5 in the case of levels. We obtain about .68 as our principal result. In light of our 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 Admittedly, labor economists sometimes take an interest in health, but essentially to control for it in 
focusing on other influences.  
5 Ruhm (2000) makes many of the same points in a study of the impact of the cycle on health as such. 
As he notes too, the relative price of health might be lower in recessions. But this could affect health 
spending either way depending on the elasticity of demand. 
6 Jacques Mairesse suggests an interesting analogy to capital to us in private discussion. During 
booms firms tend to fail to replace capital, to bring older standby equipment into operation, and to 
make minimal upkeep and repair. Then when business slows down, they undertake major repair and 
renovation. The logic is the same.  
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wider definition of automatic stabilization and the greater number of stabilizing influences in 
our work, this may not be surprising. Stabilization also comes mostly from the tax side in our 
estimates for levels, in accordance with usual views: .5 of the .68 does. Most of the rest arises 
from social expenditure. This all relates to the estimates in levels. In the case of ratios of out-
put, we find less automatic stabilization  close to .4. But taxes contribute nothing while so-
cial spending explains more than half. The rest of the stabilization comes from inertia or the 
failure of other spending to move in step with the cycle. Broadly speaking, these results in 
terms of ratios agree well with Arreaza, Sorensen and Yosha (1999), who were perhaps the 
first to approach automatic stabilization entirely from the standpoint of ratios to output. They 
too found taxes to be of little importance and spending to be the basic stabilizing force.  
 The next section will review the official procedure in dealing with automatic stabiliza-
tion. There we will also explain our basis for proposing separate estimates in levels and ratios 
and for our departures from the official procedure. Next, we shall present our econometric 
framework. Because government tax and spending responses to the cycle may reciprocally 
affect the cycle itself, we shall instrument the output gap. In addition, the responses of indi-
vidual tax and spending items may interact. Thus, we shall employ 3SLS in identifying auto-
matic stabilization.  In the following section, we shall present the basic results for our entire 
panel of 20 countries both in the form of levels and ratios. Next, we will offer some robust-
ness tests regarding smaller country samples and sub-periods. We will also offer some tests of 
symmetry of responses in recessions and expansions. Following, we will provide individual-
country results. While our panel estimates are appropriate for studying the mechanisms oper-
ating in the OECD and their strength, the precise mechanisms at work and their relative im-
portance will vary from country to country. This is all the more true in the case of our broader 
perspective on automatic stabilization.  A concluding discussion will follow. 
 
II. The Research Setting 
The official method of estimating automatic stabilization used by the OECD, the Euro-
pean Commission and the US Congressional Budget Office alike, distinguishes 5 different 
elements of the government budget balance and then studies each of them separately:  house-
hold direct taxes, business direct taxes, social security contributions, indirect taxes and unem-
ployment compensation (see Giorno et al. (1995)). The official practice is also to estimate the 
cyclical response of the 5 respective bases on which these 5 tax and spending items rest, and 
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then to apply the national tax code or else to assume a unitary elasticity of response to the 
base in order to derive the 5 items, whichever seems more appropriate. Van den Noord (2000) 
offers an up-to-date, clear and detailed review of the method (in the OECD version, used by 
the EC as well). To quote from his summary:  
First, the elasticities of the relevant tax bases and unemployment with respect to (cy-
clical) economic activity, i.e. the output gap, are estimated through regression analysis. 
Next, the elasticities of tax proceeds or expenditure [unemployment compensation] with 
respect to the relevant bases are extracted from the tax code or simply set to unity in 
cases where proportionality may be assumed. These two sets of elasticities are subse-
quently combined into reduced-form elasticities that link the cyclical components of 
taxes and expenditure to the output gap. 
This method, which has considerable standing in economics, deals with automatic sta-
bilization entirely in levels. But research often focuses on ratios. It is easy to see why. Stabili-
zation policy relates to smoothing economic performance or keeping output close to potential, 
and consequently, the problem of fiscal policy is often seen as keeping the ratio of output to 
potential output close to one.  Given this view, the critical fiscal policy variable becomes the 
ratio of the net budget balance to output, and the critical issue is to determine how the ratio 
responds to the cycle independently of any discretionary behavior by the authorities. But 
when the issue turns to ratios, it is fairly standard practice to continue using the official esti-
mates of automatic stabilization to correct the budget balance in levels for non-discretionary 
responses and then simply to divide by output in order to obtain the ratios of cyclically ad-
justed figures to output or potential output. The European Commission does so in its annual 
surveys of country members adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact. But the Commis-
sion is not the only one. Two prominent recent academic examples are Taylor (2000) and Galí 
and Perotti (2003). Both explicitly proceed from cyclically adjusted figures in levels based on 
official numbers (from the U.S. Congressional Budget Office in one case, the OECD in the 
other) to subsequent division by output (Taylor) or potential output (Galí and Perotti) in order 
to analyze discretionary fiscal policy.   
These practices would be fine if the official figures for the cyclically adjusted budget 
were really hard facts. Even if these figures are not hard facts but only estimates, the practices 
would still be acceptable if the division of the official numbers was by potential output rather 
than observed output and potential output was perfectly deterministic and not subject to any 
shocks. But if the official series are estimates and potential output is subject to supply shocks, 
then dividing by output is incorrect regardless of division by potential or observed output. 
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The estimates then yield inefficient estimates of the impact of the cycle on the ratio. For effi-
ciency, the impact on this ratio must be estimated directly.  
Furthermore, dividing by output or potential output hides the forces at work. In case of 
ratios, these forces cease to be the same. Following an adverse shock to output, if taxes stayed 
constant, the taxes would rise as a percentage of output and be destabilizing. (So would taxes 
rise as a percentage of potential output if potential output fell too and so would it be destabi-
lizing if output fell proportionately more.) By falling, the taxes are therefore less destabiliz-
ing. But in order to be stabilizing, the taxes would need to fall disproportionately. Likewise, 
in case of a fall in output, government expenditures will have a stabilizing influence on the 
ratio merely by staying constant. To fail to have any stabilizing influence the expenditures 
would need to fall as much as output or more in percentage terms. Thus, in any move from 
analysis of levels to ratios, the stabilizing forces at work tend to shift largely in favor of the 
spending side. The tendency to center on taxes in analyzing automatic stabilization is thus 
problematic even apart from the issues we raise about the wide range of government expendi-
tures that respond to the cycle.7  
In studying the impact on the ratios separately, we shall center on the budget balance 
relative to observed output rather than potential output, since in any shift of focus on ratios, 
estimates of automatic effects of the cycle on the original data deserve priority, in our opin-
ion. As indicated previously, we shall also rely entirely on simultaneous equation methods of 
estimation. Since this constitutes a departure from official practice in itself, it deserves a fur-
ther word.  
Simultaneous-equation estimation methods have several advantages over the official 
method in estimating the extent of automatic stabilization. The 4 relevant classes of taxes in 
the official estimates depend on distinct tax schedules of varying complexity that change over 
time and have different collection periods and delays. From this standpoint alone, there is 
something to be said in favor of estimating the tax responses directly rather than inferring 
them from some preset figures after studying the responses of the tax bases, however well 
founded those preset figures may be. In addition, the cyclical responses of the various bases 
                                                 
7 The report on public finances in EMU of the European Commission (2004) recognizes this argument 
and even acknowledges that the predicted ratio of output to potential output Y/Y* affects the denomi-
nator as well as the numerator in the ratio of cyclically adjusted budget balances to output (Section 3.3 
of Part II and Annex II). But the report nevertheless hangs on to the use of the official series for cycli-
cally adjusted budget balances in dealing with ratios.   
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for taxes and unemployment compensation will tend to be correlated. Hence, the residuals in 
the separate estimates of these bases will be correlated too. On this ground, seemingly unre-
lated regression would appear to be fitting. Finally, taxes and government spending could 
have a reciprocal effect on the cycle, even within a year. Because of this potential endogene-
ity, simultaneous-equation estimation methods suit best.  
 
 
III. The Econometric Framework 
At issue is the response of government revenues and expenditures to environmental 
factors independent of discretionary policy. Therefore, we need a specification focusing on 
reactions to changes in a short enough period to preclude discretionary policy. Changes in tax 
regulations take significant time. So do fresh spending decisions. As regards government 
spending, the literature on fiscal policy underlines these delays (see, for example, Canzoneri, 
Cumby and Diba (2002) and the European Commission (2004)). Three variables are likely to 
affect government revenues and expenditures even within a year and to do so fairly automati-
cally: output, inflation and the nominal rate of interest. Deviations of output (Y) from poten-
tial output (Y*) are of particular interest, since the ultimate aim is to distinguish between dis-
cretionary and non-discretionary fiscal policy.  
On these general principles, we decided to study the current yearly impact of first dif-
ferences in either YY* (as present in the OECD database), or the output gap, on first differ-
ences in government receipts and expenditures, or else first differences in Y/Y* on first differ-
ences in the ratio of government receipts and expenditures to Y. Because of the first-
difference form in a short enough period, this focuses on impact effects or short run re-
sponses. We also admitted non-discretionary effects of inflation and the interest rate into the 
analysis. But while using first differences for inflation, we kept the interest rate in levels, on 
the ground that any automatic influence of this variable on the government budget would de-
pend largely on initial debt and therefore could be cumulative. If the interest rate does have a 
cumulative effect on the interest payments on the debt, its level could affect the first differ-
ence of the budget balance just as well as the level. While we stick to these initial choices in 
our reported results throughout, it turns out that the use of levels or first differences for infla-
tion and the rate of interest makes almost no difference. Given our panel data, we included a 
common time trend as well as time and country fixed effects. Finally, since current responses 
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may result partly from lagged responses of the dependent variable, we also included the 
lagged level and the lagged first difference of the dependent variable in the estimates.8  
Our equations for individual budgetary items in our estimates therefore take the gen-
eral form:  
 (1) 'xi = Įo + Į1 t + Įt + Įc + ȕ1 'y + ȕ 2 'S + ȕ 3 rLt + ȕ 4 't1x + ȕ5 ('t1x't2x)] + İt       
   i = 1, , 15 
There are as many of these equations as individual sorts of receipts and expenditures, xi, in 
the analysis (that is, 15 of them). t refers to the time trend, Įt is a set of time fixed effects 
(year dummies), Įc is a set of country fixed effects,9 y is the output gap, S is the rate of infla-
tion, and rL is the long term interest rate. We experimented with both the short term and the 
long term interest rate in the OECD database, and the long term one is much more important. 
In case of the level form, the output gap refers to YY* and its coefficient, ȕ1, gives a mean-
ingful figure. It states by how many cents the budget will respond to a movement of the out-
put gap of one euro, for example.  (However, ȕ2 and do ȕ3 then do not give meaningful fig-
ures.) In case of the ratio form or division of the relevant budgetary item by Y, the output gap 
refers to Y/Y*, and the coefficient ȕ1 states the effect of a change in the ratio, Y/Y*, on the 
change in the ratio of the relevant tax or expenditure class to Y. (In this case, ȕ2 and ȕ3 do 
yield meaningful numbers.) We also used instruments for 'y, 'S and rL. Given the 15 differ-
ent sub-classifications of receipts and expenditures in our principal estimates (i=1, , 15), 
these estimates concern a 18-equation system.  
Our series come from the separate OECD databases for National Income and Social 
Expenditure. The Social Expenditure database shortens the available estimation period since 
the 2004 release provides data for each country from 1980 to 2001 at best. Sticking to a bal-
anced panel would then have limited the data set still more (to 12 countries). To maximize 
                                                 
8 Fiscal policy research frequently focuses on the primary government balance rather than the ob-
served one while we use the observed balance and introduce the interest rate as a separate explanatory 
variable. In fact, we do not have particularly strong views on this topic. But it would be wrong to sup-
pose that because of our choice, the outstanding net government debt drops out of our analysis. This 
debt is the sum of a starting value minus the cumulated value of net government surpluses over the 
study period (based on the consolidated government accounts including the central bank). Our country 
fixed effects incorporate the starting values of the debt in our analysis, while we explicitly admit the 
lagged values of net government surpluses. 
9 We also incorporate a German reunification dummy in level and first difference form to take account 
of the fact that the pre-unification data refers strictly to West Germany.  
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degrees of freedom we have essentially employed an unbalanced panel throughout. As a re-
sult, we have 20 countries (including 13 of the 15 members of the European Union in 2001, 
the closing year of the data) and a total of 344 observations. The missing EU members are 
Luxembourg and Greece, and the 7 OECD countries outside the EU are Australia, Canada, 
Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the US. We do not use Japan in our panel 
data estimates though we do so in the individual-country tests for a reason that we will ex-
plain. 
 
IV. The Data and Econometric Results 
(a) The data 
We may begin with a general look at orders of magnitude for the variables on the ex-
penditure side in our study. Table 1 shows averages and standard deviations of these variables 
as percentages of total government expenditures or else as percentages of GDP for the 344 
annual observations in our sample period 1980-2001.  
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics on Government Expenditure and its composition. 
 
      % of Total Government 
    Expenditure 
    % of GDP 
 
 mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
Total Government Expenditure 100 48.0 8.3
  of which,    
(1) Health Expenditure 12.6 2.2 6.0 3.8
(2) Total Social Security Spending 29.4 4.6 14.2 3.8
 
Key Components of Social Security Spending:    
     (2a) Retirement Cash Benefits 16.3 5.6 7.8 2.7
     (2b) Incapacity Related Cash Benefits 3.8 1.6 1.8 0.8
     (2c) Unemployment Compensation 3.0 1.6 1.5 0.9
     (2d) Sickness Pay 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.6
(3) Subsidies 3.9 2.2 1.9 1.0
 
The table distinguishes 3 separate sorts of government social spending based on the 
statistics: health expenditures, social security spending and subsidies. There is a further sub-
division of social security spending in the table between retirement (old age cash benefits 
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including early retirement pension and survivors cash benefits), incapacity benefits (related to 
disability, occupational injury and disease but excluding temporary sick pay), paid sick leave, 
and unemployment compensation. It is important to keep in mind that the health expenditures 
refer to a class of government spending on goods and services while the rest of social expen-
ditures are either transfer payments to persons, in the case of social security, or else transfer 
payments to firms, in the case of subsidies.  
As can be seen, retirement cash benefits are by far the largest component of social ex-
penditure, averaging more than 16% of government spending in the aggregate; health is next, 
averaging almost 13%. Unemployment compensation is much lower, at 3%. Interestingly, 
incapacity benefits are also higher than unemployment compensation but mildly so. Not only 
is the size of spending on retirement and on health larger than the other forms of social spend-
ing, but both of these forms are more uniform than the rest, including unemployment compen-
sation. Health spending is by far the most uniform of all. Taken as a percentage of total gov-
ernment spending, it is 6 times larger than its standard deviation. By contrast, incapacity, un-
employment compensation, and government subsidies to firms (relative to total government 
spending) are on average only around twice as large as their standard deviations. Of these last 
three rubrics, spending on incapacity benefits is also the most uniform. Paid sick leave is the 
least uniform social spending category of all as well as the smallest. These differences in uni-
formity reflect essentially international differences rather than temporal ones: they persist 
almost unchanged if we compare the 20 country averages over the study period (either in lev-
els or per capita) and thereby abstract from movement over time. This gives the impression 
that if there is any cyclical responsiveness in government spending on health, retirement, in-
capacity, sickness, unemployment, and government subsidies in the cross-sectional evidence, 
there is a good chance that this responsiveness will be reflected more clearly in the individ-
ual-country estimates for health and retirement than for the other social spending groupings.  
We will return to the accuracy of this initial impression later on. 
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(b) The results for the aggregates  
 Let us begin discussing the econometric work with the estimates of equation (1) with-
out any disaggregation at all, or in the case of a single equation for the net government sur-
plus or the ratio of this surplus to output as the dependent variable. Table 2, which contains 
these estimates, omits all coefficients except those for '(YY*) or '(Y/Y*), 'S and rL. It also 
shows both OLS and 3SLS estimates. All of the instruments for '(YY*) or '(Y/Y*), 'S and 
rL in the 3SLS estimates are listed in the notes to the table. They include, among others, the 
lagged values of taxes and spending, or the two variables whose reciprocal effect on '(YY*) 
or '(Y/Y*), 'S and rL is of basic concern.  
 
 
Table 2: Aggregate Estimates  Net Government Surplus 
 
20 countries,  Levels Ratios 
1982-2001, n=344 OLS 3SLS OLS 3SLS 
Change in output gap 0.497*** 0.452***  0.291***  0.341***
'(YY*) or '(Y/Y*)  (.039)  (.069)  (.049) (0.045) 
Change in inflation, 'S n.r.** n.r.*  0.0016*** -0.00002 
 (n.r.) (n.r.)  (.0004) (.0006) 
Long term interest rate, rL n.r. n.r.
**  0.0002  0. 0005 
 (n.r.) (n.r.) (.0004) (.0005) 
R2 0.63 0.62  0.55  0.52 
Notes: 
Variables are expressed in current prices. n.r. means not reported. Where relevant, estimated coefficients are 
followed by ***, ** and * to denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% significance levels respectively. Stan-
dard errors are reported in parentheses. In case of the 3SLS results pseudo R2s are reported.  Instruments em-
ployed include contemporaneous oil price inflation along with lagged values of aggregate OECD GDP, govern-
ment current expenditure and revenues, the change in the non-working population, exports as a % of GDP, and 
the instrumented variables themselves along with country and time fixed effects. The R2  from the instrumenting 
regressions for the change in the output gap in levels, this change in ratios, the change in inflation and the long 
term interest rate are 0.46, 0.54. 0.42 and 0.94 respectively. 
The OLS estimate for the impact of the output gap on the net government surplus is .5, 
in agreement with the literature. The corresponding OLS estimate in ratios is lower at .29. In 
the case of the 3SLS estimates, the one in levels is .45, somewhat below the OLS one, and the 
one in ratios is a little higher at 0.34. In principle, both sets of 3SLS estimates should be be-
low the corresponding OLS ones, since the failure to consider the reciprocal influence of fis-
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cal policy on current performance in the OLS estimates should lead to overestimates not un-
derestimates of automatic fiscal policy. This condition is met in levels not in ratios.10  
(c) The results for the decomposition 
 We turn next to the 3SLS estimates of our full system of 18 equations after the de-
composition of the net government surplus into 15 different rubrics. The decomposition rests 
on the following balance sheet identity in the OECD accounts: net government surplus = (1) 
direct household taxes + (2) other direct taxes, primarily levied on business + (3) social secu-
rity taxes + (4) indirect taxes  (5) current (wage and non-wage) spending plus capital spend-
ing exclusive of social health expenditures (listed as current spending n.h., or net of health, in 
the tables)  (6) social health expenditures  (7) other government consumption  (8) social 
spending on pensions  (9) social spending on incapacity related benefits  (10) social spend-
ing on sick pay  (11) unemployment compensation  (12) other social expenditures  (13) 
government subsidies to firms  (14) other government transfer payments  (15) net interest 
payments. But in reporting the results, we shall ignore four of these accounts: the three resid-
ual ones, (7), (12) and (14) and net interest (15). Of these, the three residual ones are difficult 
to interpret and net interest is often excluded from the start by focusing on the primary sur-
plus. (Net interest always responds significantly to the output gap with the right negative 
sign.) In addition, we will base our estimates of the aggregate response of the net government 
surplus on the statistically significant values of the 11 other accounts  or those that we do 
report  at the .95 confidence level. In this respect, we follow official practice. The official 
method of calculating total automatic stabilization is to add up the estimates for the 5 rubrics 
that are deemed significant from the start. We do the same except that we admit the potential 
significance of 11 rubrics and only retain those rubrics that prove statistically significant.  
                                                 
10 To explain, suppose that a cyclical rise in output raises the net government surplus. In principle, this 
rise should limit the increase in output. If it does, then the correction for the reciprocal influence 
means raising the swings in ǻ(YY*) above observed levels: that is, substituting higher positive val-
ues of ǻ(YY*) in expansions and higher negative values of it in contractions. On the other hand, 
following the cyclical corrections, the series for the net government surplus stay the same. Thus, re-
gressing the latter series on the corrected (larger absolute) values for ǻ(YY*) should yield lower 
coefficients. We get this result for levels not for ratios. 
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Table 3 contains the results. In the interests of legibility and space, we show only the 
coefficients of '(YY*) or '(Y/Y*) and omit those of 'S and rL in this next table. The in-
struments for '(YY*) or '(Y/Y*), 'S and rL are identical to those employed in the aggregate 
estimates.  
Table 3: Disaggregate Estimates
3SLS Estimates, 20 countries,  
1981-2001, n=344 
Levels 
'(YY*) 
Ratios 
'(Y/Y*) 
Revenues:   
Household Direct Taxes    0.300***   -0.0396 
 (0.022) (0.032) 
Other Direct Taxes   0.156*** -0.00369 
 (0.016) (0.025) 
Social Security Contributions  0.0445*** -0.0350 
 (0.014) (0.023) 
Indirect Taxes  0.0141 -0.00724 
 (0.015) (0.026) 
Expenditure:   
Current Spending n.h. -0.0104 -0.139***
 (0.027) (0.041) 
Health Expenditure -0.0437*** -0.0549***
 (0.0060) (0.011) 
Age Related  Benefits -0.0451*** -0.0797***
 (0.0052) (0.013) 
Incapacity Related Benefits -0.0150*** -0.0264***
 (0.0019) (0.0052) 
Unemployment Compensation -0.0407*** -0.0486***
 (0.0047) (0.0092) 
Sick Pay -0.00186 -0.0151**
 (0.0027) (0.0060) 
Subsidies -0.0314*** -0.0265**
 (0.0044) (0.011) 
Notes: see Table 2. 
As can be seen, the results are as signaled in the introduction. A positive output gap 
produces 50 cents more tax collection per dollar in levels. Direct household taxes (constitut-
ing .28 of total government revenues) are the most important, business taxes (constituting .07 
of the total revenues) are much less but still notably so, social security taxes (.23) far less still 
and indirect taxes (.29) not at all. On the spending side, government purchases of goods and 
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services does not respond but there is 14 cents less social spending per dollar of output gap, 
with pensions, health and unemployment compensation each accounting for around 4 cents. 
Incapacity benefits drop by one to two cents per dollar of output gap while sickness benefits 
do not respond significantly at all. 
In the case of ratios, taxes contribute nothing to stabilization: all of the contribution 
comes from the spending side. In other words, no category of taxes proves either progressive 
or regressive. On the other hand, government spending on goods and services exclusive of 
spending on health shows up as highly stabilizing. Since this spending does not show up as 
significant in levels, its stabilizing response in ratios can only be interpreted as coming from 
inertia or, more generally, a failure to keep up with the cycle  With regard to social spending, 
including health, all of the influences that were stabilizing before in levels remain signifi-
cantly so. But now the contribution of social spending on pensions becomes notably more 
important than either health or unemployment compensation. This spending contributes 8 
percentage points to stabilization as opposed to 5.5 for health and 4.9 for unemployment com-
pensation. In addition, sick benefits become significant and the sum of sick benefits and inca-
pacity benefits contributes nearly as much to stabilization as unemployment compensation. 
Based on all of the significant social spending influences, the total contribution of social 
spending is the single most important factor in automatic stabilization, accounting for more 
than half of the total. Total automatic stabilization from all significant sources is .68 in levels 
and .39 in ratios. We shall retain these figures in preference to the earlier ones in Table 2. 
Before proceeding, it is interesting to pause once more on the fact, noted in the intro-
duction, that our results for incapacity pay and sick pay contradict a section of the literature 
claiming that both of these sorts of expenditures move pro-cyclically. As we also observed 
before, this interpretation is closely connected to the use of the rate of unemployment as the 
measure of the cycle. Simply in order to shed more light on this pending issue, we substituted 
the change in the rate of unemployment for '(YY*) or '(Y/Y*) in our 18-equation frame-
work. Concomitantly, we deflated the spending variables by prices, as makes sense if unem-
ployment is treated as an explanatory variable. In this case sick pay moves negatively with the 
rate of unemployment both in levels and ratios, though not significantly so, while incapacity 
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pay moves positively with unemployment in levels and ratios and very significantly so. Thus, 
the results with respect to sign conform to the conflicting literature regarding sick pay but 
clearly contradict this literature concerning incapacity pay.11  
The conformity concerning sick pay is statistically weak, as mentioned.  But even had 
it been strong, we would still contest any inference of a pro-cyclical movement in sick pay on 
the earlier ground that unemployment and sick pay are both jointly determined. We would 
especially insist on this joint determination in the context of business cycles. Imagine the ex-
istence of a negative relationship between unemployment and sick pay for the sort of reasons 
stressed in the pro-cyclical literature: higher costs of shirking when unemployment is higher 
in particular. Imagine too that movements in the recorded unemployment rate occur not only 
for cyclical reasons but also for secular ones related to demography and changes in benefit 
eligibility criteria and monitoring.  During recessions, employers will not only tend to sepa-
rate themselves from less reliable workers (thus leaving them without any ability to claim sick 
pay for temporary illness), just as this conflicting literature suggests, but they may also layoff 
some workers who are ill, or whom they believe to be eligible to claim sick benefits, that the 
employers wish to retain. This last tendency implies a positive association between sick pay 
and unemployment in recessions. In regressions of the change in sick pay on the change in 
unemployment, the forces leading to a negative relationship between the two (the disciplining 
effect) might dominate, while in a regression like ours, identifying the cycle with impulses 
arising from the goods market without any trend (and therefore excluding the long run forces 
working on unemployment), the positive association between movements in unemployment 
and sick pay might dominate instead. The fact that sick pay is also significantly stabilizing in 
ratios but not in levels in our results is not a problem. This outcome could simply stem from 
the impact of the cycle on the denominator alone.  
 
 
                                                 
11 In fact, the contradiction regarding disability pay strictly relates to Boone and van Ours (2002, 
2006), who find that reported work accidents  not exactly the same thing as disability pay though 
positively related  rise when unemployment goes down. On the other hand, Khan, Gerdtham and 
Jansson (2004), who use disability pay and sick pay as the dependent variables as we do and who ex-
pect negative signs in both cases, find the same positive effect of unemployment on disability pay that 
we get, contrary to their expectations (while they do get the negative sign they expect for sick pay). 
Other differences should be mentioned between us and the latter: they estimate in levels rather than 
first differences, they do not correct the nominal variables for prices, and they add some additional 
demographic controls that we omit. 
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V. Robustness Checks and Extensions 
In this section we investigate the robustness of our findings in a variety of ways. We 
check the sensitivity of the results to dropping countries one at a time, we investigate behav-
ior within the EU sub-group in the sample, and we examine panel estimates over the sub-
samples 1982-1991 and 1992-2001. Following, we check the sensitivity of our key results to 
an alternative measure of the cycle and finally we test the null hypothesis of symmetry of ef-
fects against the alternative of asymmetric adjustment of fiscal variables to positive and nega-
tive output gaps. 
 
(a) Smaller country samples 
Do our results depend critically on any single country? In order to check, we sequen-
tially dropped one country at a time. This test is the one that led us to remove Japan from the 
panel estimates in the first place. The problem was not that Japan affected the signs or the 
significance of the variables. But its presence did notably alter the size of the coefficients. 
This remained true when we split the sample in half between the eighties and the nineties (or 
thereabout). Therefore, whatever it is that makes Japan alter the size of the coefficients sig-
nificantly holds true for both sub-periods. However, we saw no reason on this ground to ex-
clude Japan in our subsequent individual-country tests. The results of the panel estimates 
dropping one country at a time following the exclusion of Japan appear in Tables A1a and 
A1b of the appendix. All alternative 19-country sub-samples are shown. The table repeats the 
parameter estimates for the full 20-country sample on the first row to facilitate comparison. It 
can be seen that both the size and significance of the parameter estimates are fairly insensitive 
to the exclusion of any one member of the sample.  
(b) EU panel results 
Table 4 pursues the previous test by paring down the sample to the sub-sample con-
sisting of the 15 members of the European Union. Once again we show the results for the full 
sample in the table (by column in this case) to facilitate comparison. There is no systematic 
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difference between the EU15 and the full sample on the revenue side except for a significant 
positive effect of the cycle on other direct taxes (primarily business taxes) in ratios in the 
case of the EU15. The differences are more notable on the spending side though these too are 
mostly moderate except for health expenditure in levels. In short, the results for the EU15 
broadly agree with those for the full sample. 
 
(c) Split Sample Estimates in 1982-1991 and 1992-2001 
The contributions of the different categories of spending and revenue could have al-
tered over time. To look into this question, we conducted split sample estimates for 1982-
1991 and for 1992-2001. There are generally fewer observations for the earlier period than the 
later one: 144 rather than 199.  Some countries even fall out entirely of the 1982-1991 sam-
ple. Unfortunately, therefore, apparent differences over time between the two sub-samples 
could result simply from changes in the country composition of the sub-samples. In order to 
control for this possibility, we conducted balanced panel estimates. This limited us to 11 
countries12 and about two-thirds of the observations. The resulting estimates are less reliable; 
there is a decline in precision that is reflected in larger standard errors. Therefore, we only use 
the balanced panel estimates (which we do not report) to throw light on whether our results 
for the full panel depend mostly on changes in the country composition over time.  
Table 5 shows the results for the two sub-periods. On the revenue side, the results in 
ratios reveal no pronounced difference over time except that social security contributions be-
gin to move counter-cyclically  i.e. in a stabilizing direction  in the nineties. This move-
ment is strongly confirmed in the balanced sample and thus evidently reflects a genuine 
change over time. On the revenue side in levels, direct taxes appear to become much more 
stabilizing in the nineties, and quite importantly, indirect taxes emerge as stabilizing too in 
each sub-period though these taxes had not appeared as such in the full sample. The change in 
                                                 
12 The 11 countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland and the US. 
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direct taxes also reflects a genuine movement over time, judging from the balanced sample 
results covering 12 countries. On the spending side, health expenditures become clearly more 
stabilizing both in levels and ratios in the more recent period and pensions marginally so, 
while sick pay, which had seemed stabilizing only in ratios in the sample period as a whole, 
appear to become somewhat so in levels as well in the more recent period. Once again, the 
balanced sample results give little reason to doubt that these changes reflect movements over 
time.  Also of note, unemployment compensation may have become less stabilizing during the 
sample period, especially in ratios, but this result is not marked. 
 
 (d) Alternative measures of the cycle
In an additional experiment we replaced the OECD measure of the output gap with HP 
filtered output data.  This only affects the dating of the cycles marginally although it does 
modify the steepness and the depth of the cycles.  Generally, the results are very similar to 
those with the OECD measure in the case of ratios; but the differences in levels are important. 
This is one of a number of signs we have had throughout the study that the results in ratios are 
more robust than those in levels. Early experiments with small differences in specification, 
relating to the instruments in particular, had no mentionable effect on the estimates in ratios 
but occasionally some impact on the results in levels. In the case of levels, the most general 
difference in the event of the HP-filtered measure of the gap is that the stabilizing influence of 
receipts appears much smaller relative to that of expenditures. This difference in the case of 
the HP-filtered measure supports our general emphasis on expenditures. But notwithstanding 
we have a basic preference for the results with the OECD measure of the output gap, partly 
based on earlier experiments with both measures by the OECD as well as our own.  
(e) Testing for asymmetric responses to the output gap  
There could be asymmetric effects of contractions and expansions. This would matter 
since asymmetries would mean possible progressive changes in individual components of 
government spending over a series of cycles and perhaps even the aggregate and the govern-
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ment debt as a whole. We test for such asymmetry with a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 when Y < Y* and 0 otherwise. By interacting this dummy with the output gap term we can 
test for the significance of differences in responses to the cycle when output is below poten-
tial. Table 6 shows the outcomes. A number of significant asymmetries emerge in levels, but 
only two persist in ratios. These are then the only two that we shall treat as adequately con-
firmed. Interestingly, neither of them concerns unemployment compensation, in regard to 
which the cyclical responses appear symmetric (or more exactly, not significantly asymmet-
ric) both in levels and ratios.  The first of the two significant asymmetries, which holds at the 
95% confidence level, relates to pensions. It says that the stabilizing movement of this cate-
gory of spending in booms outweighs its similar movement in contractions. In other words, 
the postponement of retirement in good times has a stronger impact on benefit spending than 
the shift to early retirement in bad times. This cyclical aspect would moderate the size of age-
related expenditures in the budget over time. The second notable asymmetry concerns social 
security contributions, whose stabilizing response to the cycle in booms exceeds its similar 
response in recessions at the 10% level of significance. If so, the cycle strengthens this com-
ponent of government revenues over time.13
VI. Individual Country Estimates 
Of course, individual countries cannot be expected to rest their discretionary fiscal 
policy on panel data results covering 19 other countries. National authorities can only rea-
sonably use panel results to inform the estimates of automatic stabilization at home on which 
they base themselves. Thus, we propose some individual country estimates as well.  With a 
mere 20 time series observations per country as a maximum, 3SLS is not even feasible within 
                                                 
13 It might be tempting to relate both of these results to those in our earlier split samples showing that 
the stabilizing influence of pensions and social security receipts both rise over time. But since all of 
our estimates of effects of the output gap pertain to percentage influences (number of cents per euro or 
percentage-point changes in one ratio in response to another), the appearance of any connection may 
be false. Notwithstanding, if cyclical swings of pensions and social security receipts really grow over 
time, as our split sample results say, then if both the split sample and the asymmetric results are also 
even partly positively related to the growth of pensions and social security receipts over time, the two 
sets of results would be reinforcing.   
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our framework. Though it may be feasible for some countries, IV estimation is not well ad-
vised either, since the instrumenting regressions would tend to have little explanatory power, 
as we have verified. The theoretical gain from the added consistency will not compensate for 
the loss of precision. Consequently, we will stick to simple OLS estimates in this section.  In 
addition, we will only entertain OLS estimates in case of a minimum of 15 observations. Five 
countries then fall out (Austria, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland), which 
leaves us 16, including Japan. In discussing the results of these tests, we will focus exclu-
sively on the issue of the impact of the other components of social spending besides unem-
ployment compensation on automatic stabilization.  For this reason, we show only the results 
for social benefits to persons in Table 7. 
Upon first glance at this table, it is difficult not to be struck by the higher frequency of 
significant results for unemployment compensation than any of the 4 other categories of so-
cial spending. Nothing in the earlier estimates or the raw data necessarily prepared us for this 
result. The coefficients and Student ts of the other social categories besides unemployment 
compensation were often as high and the raw data in Table 1 showed higher averages and 
higher ratios of averages to international dispersion  more international uniformity  for 
some of the other categories. Still it is noteworthy that unemployment compensation is of no 
importance at all in the OLS estimates for the US and Japan. This spending also only matters 
for Spain and Sweden depending on the choice of levels or first differences.  
As an initial indicator of the possible importance of cyclical responses of other catego-
ries social spending besides unemployment compensation, we use the ratio of the sum of the 
individual estimates of all 5 social categories to unemployment compensation alone (i.e., the 
ratio of column 6 to column 1) in column 8. This ratio then exceeds 3 to 1 for a number of 
countries. In descending order, the countries are Japan, Sweden, the US, Belgium, France, 
Italy and the Netherlands in levels, and Japan, the US, the UK, Italy, Ireland and France in 
ratios. Not surprisingly, given the low (as well as insignificant) estimates for unemployment 
compensation in Japan and the US, the ratio is exceptionally high for these two countries. 
True, there are also a number of cases where the ratio is close to one or below it. But upon 
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examination, except for Denmark these are all instances where health spending is highly pro-
cyclical (though insignificant) and this factor alone can account for the low ratio. The lowest 
pro-cyclical coefficient for health spending in these other examples is the non-negligible fig-
ure of nearly 2% for Australia. In the end, Denmark seems to us the only instance where the 
OLS results are truly puzzling, as they show highly significant destabilizing effects for pen-
sions and incapacity benefits in levels (but not ratios), contrary to the panel data results.14 15
Most pertinent, however, are the results by country for health, pensions, incapacity 
benefits and sick pay. If we look at those results in levels, we find only a small number of 
significant coefficients (especially when we consider that 2 of these coefficients are the prob-
lematic ones for Denmark). Notwithstanding, two of the significant coefficients that do arise 
concern the US, where health spending and pensions both enter as significantly stabilizing 
influences, while unemployment compensation does not do so at all. The situation in ratios 
differs radically, however. Significant coefficients abound for health, pensions, and incapacity 
benefits, all of which go in the stabilizing direction, in accordance with the panel estimates. 
There are fewer significant signs for sick pay and those few are contradictory, going off in 
both directions. Interestingly, the two cases of significant positive (destabilizing) coefficients 
for sick pay, Portugal and Sweden, are also consistent with the evidence of the importance of 
disincentives to report sick in recessions for people holding temporary contracts. Spain should 
be considered in this connection too since this country has a positive coefficient for sick pay 
(though moderate and insignificant) while it has a particularly high share of workers holding 
temporary contracts in the EU.16 Spain, Portugal and Sweden all feature heavily in the litera-
ture on the implications of increased use of temporary versus permanent contracts (see, for 
                                                 
14 Still, as seen in table A1 of the appendix, the presence of Denmark does not much affect the panel 
results either in levels or in ratios.  
15 We also checked on the reliability of column 6 with the use of column 7, where the estimate treats 
social spending as a single aggregate. The results in this next column differ little from column 6 with 
the outstanding exception of Spain both in levels and ratios (and perhaps also the Netherlands, strictly 
in ratios). This supports our attention to column 6. 
16 In the third quarter of 2005, Eurostat Labour Force Survey data indicate that the share of employees 
with temporary contracts reached 14.7% in the EU15, ranging from 34.4% in Spain, 19.9% in Portugal 
and 17.3% in Sweden to under 10% in Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and the UK; see Table 9 in 
Romans and Hardarson (2006). 
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example Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), Bentolila and Dolado (1994), Jimeno and Toharia 
(1996), Bover et al (2000) and Arai and Skogman Thoursie (2005)).  
Some of the other country-by-country results in ratios should be mentioned too. 
Health, pensions and incapacity benefits are all significantly stabilizing at the 1 percent confi-
dence level in Canada as well as unemployment compensation. The same is true for Sweden 
and the UK, except that in each country one of the 4 coefficients has a below-one-percent 
confidence level. Both Japan and Finland are interesting: both countries show significantly 
stabilizing influences for all social spending categories, including sick pay, except unem-
ployment compensation in Japan and health spending in Finland. This makes quite a few 
country cases where the national results clearly indicate the importance of several elements of 
social spending besides unemployment compensation. 
In sum, the individual-country results support our basic message that it is a mistake to 
ignore all social spending benefits to persons except for unemployment compensation in ana-
lyzing automatic stabilization. This may be a nuisance from a purely analytical standpoint 
since the mechanisms pertaining to the diversity of social programs will vary greatly by coun-
try. This will make individual-country study essential and mean that the relevant time series 
data will be short and the test results may be fragile. But the situation does not differ notably 
on this score for household direct taxes, other direct taxes, social security revenues, indirect 
taxes and unemployment compensation  the categories of government receipts and expendi-
tures that receive prominent attention today in studies of automatic stabilization. The problem 
is simply one we must face. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
In this paper we have exploited detailed data from the OECD Social Expenditure Da-
tabase along with the national accounts aggregates from the OECD Economic Outlook Data-
base in order to reassess automatic stabilization.  We found that health spending, pensions, 
and incapacity benefits are prominent along with unemployment compensation in automatic 
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stabilization. This result was only to be expected concerning pensions; and even in the case of 
health spending and incapacity benefits, need not arouse surprise. Perhaps the stabilizing na-
ture of the cyclical movements of health spending and incapacity benefits could not have been 
foreseen.  But the hypothesis that either of these 2 categories of social spending is a-cyclical 
goes contrary to a good deal of previous theory and evidence, particularly in the fields of la-
bor and health. In conclusion, we firmly reject the conjectures in earlier macro studies, such 
as those we quoted from Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), Galí and Perotti (2003), Perotti 
(2002), that unemployment benefits are the only current expenditures that matter.   
As another fundamental part of our study, we have underlined the benefit of direct es-
timates of ratios of government receipts and expenditures to output wherever the ratios are the 
relevant issue, as they often are. When the ratios matter, the main sources of automatic stabi-
lization swing from the receipt to the expenditure side of the government budget, and health 
expenditures, pensions, and incapacity benefits become even more important than they are 
otherwise. Moreover, according to our results, the estimates of automatic stabilization in ra-
tios are more robust and reliable than those in levels. It seems too that some important move-
ments in automatic stabilization have taken place over recent decades. In particular, unem-
ployment compensation has lost ground relative to incapacity and health expenditures.  
Several directions of further research are evident. More investigation of the mecha-
nisms that underlie the responses of the various social spending categories would clearly be 
warranted. This is perhaps especially true for health spending, whose cyclical behavior has 
never been studied before, to our knowledge. There has been much attention to the impact of 
the cycle on health, not health spending, and while intertemporal substitution will clearly ex-
plain the stabilizing responses of such spending in our results, corroboration of this explana-
tion or the discovery of a new one would be useful. The welfare consequences of automatic 
stabilization would also deem examination in the light of our results. If automatic stabilization 
depends not only on taxes and unemployment compensation but also on cyclical movements 
in health care, age of retirement and propensity to claim incapacity for work, then the welfare 
consequences would seem to differ (if only because there will then be more permanent effects 
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on certain classes of individuals), and the optimal spending responses to those swings may 
differ too. The welfare consequences of automatic stabilization are a difficult topic, perhaps 
not sufficiently studied, and the basis for the familiar advice to fiscal policy authorities simply 
to let the automatic stabilizers work is not entirely clear.17 According to the current view of 
automatic stabilization, this phenomenon would seem to be mostly accidental, since it de-
pends predominantly on tax collection, which was never constructed with the aim of stabiliz-
ing output in mind. But if automatic stabilization hinges on retirement, health care and inca-
pacity pay as well as taxes, the accidental nature of the design is greater and it would be still 
more of a coincidence if the outcome were close to optimal. Finally, a key implication of our 
analysis is that the series for cyclically adjusted budget balances should be constructed differ-
ently. If so, measures of fiscal stance need to be re-estimated. Many estimates of the impact of 
discretionary fiscal policy on the economy then need to be so as well.  
 
17 For some critical discussion of this advice, see Farina and Tamborini (2003) and Buti et al. (2003).  
Table 4 – Estimates for the European Union 
 
3SLS Estimates Levels -coefficients on '(YY*) Ratios  coefficients on '(Y/Y*) 
  All EU15 
n=344 n=239 
All 
n=344 
EU15 
n=239 
 
Revenues:       
Household Direct Taxes    0.300***    0.269***     -0.0396 -0.0147
 (0.022)      (0.035) (0.032) (0.042)
Other Direct Taxes   0.156***  0.128***  -0.00369  0.0760***  
 (0.016)      (0.031) (0.025) (0.029)
Social Security Contributions  0.0445***  0.0844*     -0.0350 -0.00494
 (0.014)      (0.046) (0.023) (0.034)
Indirect Taxes  0.0141 -0.0284  -0.00724 -0.0406  
 (0.015)      (0.047) (0.026) (0.032)
Expenditure:       
Current Spending n.h. -0.0104 -0.428***  -0.139*** -0.152***  
 (0.027)      (0.068) (0.041) (0.054)
Health Expenditure -0.0437***  0.00420  -0.0549*** -0.0522***  
 (0.0060)      (0.013) (0.011) (0.014)
Age Related  Benefits -0.0451*** -0.0730***  -0.0797*** -0.0826***  
 (0.0052)      (0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Incapacity Related Benefits -0.0150*** -0.0431***  -0.0264*** -0.0178**  
 (0.0019)      (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0072)
Unemployment Compensation -0.0407*** -0.0404***  -0.0486*** -0.0662***  
 (0.0047)      (0.011) (0.0092) (0.011)
Sick Pay -0.00186  0.00967  -0.0151** -0.0202**  
 (0.0027)      (0.011) (0.0060) (0.0088)
Subsidies  -0.0314*** -0.0985*** -0.0265** -0.0618***  
 (0.0044)      (0.012) (0.011) (0.016)
Notes: see Table 2.  
Table 5 – Split Sample Estimates for 1982-1991 and 1992-2001 
 
3SLS Estimates Levels -coefficients on '(YY*) Ratios  coefficients on '(Y/Y*) 
 All 
n=344 
1982-91 
n=145 
1992-01 
n=199 
All 
n=344 
1982-91 
N=145 
1992-01 
n=199 
Revenues:       
Household Direct Taxes    0.300***    0.106***  0.305*** -0.0396   -0.0771  0.012
 (0.022)      (0.024) (0.025) (0.032) (0.049) (0.035)
Other Direct Taxes   0.156***  0.128***  0.224*** -0.00369   -0.0272  0.0069
 (0.016)      (0.010) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.035)
Social Security Contributions  0.0445***  0.0564***  0.0298 -0.0350  0.0107 -0.0626**
 (0.014)      (0.0099) (0.020) (0.023) (0.032) (0.028)
Indirect Taxes  0.0141  0.0403***  0.0415** -0.00724   -0.0168 -0.045
 (0.015)      (0.012) (0.018) (0.026) (0.029) (0.033)
Expenditure:       
Current Spending n.h. -0.0104  0.0494*** -0.0922** -0.139*** -0.121** -0.147***
 (0.027)      (0.019) (0.039) (0.041) (0.054) (0.048)
Health Expenditure -0.0437*** -0.0224*** -0.0624*** -0.0549*** -0.0156 -0.0762***
 (0.0060)      (0.0057) (0.0081) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011)
Age Related  Benefits -0.0451*** -0.0393*** -0.0423*** -0.0797*** -0.0584*** -0.0839***
 (0.0052)      (0.0046) (0.0063) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016)
Incapacity Related Benefits -0.0150*** -0.00227  -0.0240*** -0.0264*** -0.0015 -0.0342***
 (0.0019)      (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0052) (0.0076) (0.0056)
Unemployment Compensation -0.0407*** -0.0319*** -0.0280*** -0.0486*** -0.0533*** -0.0368***
 (0.0047)      (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0092) (0.013) (0.0100)
Sick Pay -0.00186 -0.00069 0.00157 -0.0151** -0.00922 -0.0166***
 (0.0027)      (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0060) (0.0094) (0.0048)
Subsidies   -0.0314*** -0.0110*** -0.0406*** -0.0265** -0.0233 0.00155
 (0.0044)      (0.0040) (0.0055) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013)
Notes: see Table 2.  
Table 6 – Testing Symmetry versus Asymmetry of response 
 
3SLS Estimates Levels -coefficients on '(YY*) Ratios  coefficients on '(Y/Y*) 
n=344 All Y<Y*  All 
 
Y<Y*  
Revenues:       
Household Direct Taxes    0.296*** -0.0702     -0.0306 -0.00036
 (0.044)      (0.055) (0.029) (0.0008)
Other Direct Taxes   0.327*** -0.236***   0.0505**  0.00005  
 (0.028)      (0.036) (0.022) (0.0006)
Social Security Contributions -0.0140  0.0611*  -0.0391*  0.00100*  
 (0.028)      (0.036) (0.021) (0.0006)
Indirect Taxes -0.0425  0.0917**   0.00983  0.00011  
 
(0.030)      (0.039) (0.023) (0.0007)
Expenditure:       
Current Spending n.h.  0.0703 -0.0992  -0.107***  0.00107  
 (0.054)      (0.068) (0.037) (0.0010)
Health Expenditure -0.0704*** 0.0525***  -0.0440***  0.00025  
 (0.012)      (0.015) (0.0097) (0.0003)
Age Related  Benefits -0.0315*** -0.00883  -0.0672***  0.00067**  
 (0.0100) (0.013)    (0.012) (0.0003)
Incapacity Related Benefits -0.0185*** 0.00962*    -0.0273*** -0.0000922
 (0.0040)      (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0001)
Unemployment Compensation -0.0203** -0.0248**  -0.0403***  0.00009  
 (0.0095)      (0.012) (0.0082) (0.0002)
Sick Pay -0.00519  0.0114  -0.00638  0.00002  
 (0.0056)      (0.0072) (0.0054) (0.0002)
Subsidies     -0.0170* -0.0190 -0.0778*** -0.00107
 (0.0091)      (0.012) (0.024) (0.0007)
Notes: see Table 2.   
 
 Table 7a – Individual Country Results  
 
  
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 
LEVELS 
N 
 
unemployment 
compensation 
health 
age related 
benefits 
incapacity 
related 
benefits 
        sick  
pay 
sum of 
separately estd 
coefs. 
columns 1-5 
estimates 
using  
aggregate of 
columns 1-5 
ratio  
column 6 to 
column 1 
Australia 20 -0.0760***  0.0175 -0.0114  0.0027 -0.0167 -0.084 -0.132 1.105 
Belgium         20 -0.0474*** -0.0718 -0.0837 -0.0176 -0.0286 -0.249 -0.264** 5.253 
Canada         20 -0.0673*** -0.0060 -0.0184 -0.0046  0.0002 -0.096 -0.076* 1.426 
Denmark 20 -0.1040** -0.0084  0.1390***  0.0350*** -0.0110   0.051  0.029 -0.490 
Finland         20 -0.0735** -0.0038 -0.0289* -0.0085 -0.0052 -0.120 -0.088* 1.633 
France         15 -0.0474*** -0.0368 -0.0917* -0.0129 -0.0036 -0.192 -0.136* 4.051 
Germany 20 -0.0719***  0.0727  0.0004  0.0002  0.0023  0.004   0.013 -0.056 
Ireland 15 -0.0397*  0.0351  0.0186  0.0034  0.0092  0.027 -0.002 -0.680 
Italy         20 -0.0552*** -0.0344 -0.0577 -0.0157 -0.0502 -0.213 -0.230** 3.859 
Japan         20 -0.0024 -0.0108 -0.0122 -0.0009  0.0001 -0.026 -0.024 10.833 
Netherlands         20 -0.0790*** -0.0535 -0.0742** -0.0208 -0.0334 -0.261 -0.240** 3.304 
Portugal 19 -0.0387***  0.0285  0.0005 -0.0499**  0.0097 -0.050 -0.036 1.292 
Spain         20 -0.0656* -0.0026 -0.0264 -0.0057 -0.0326** -0.133 -0.148 2.027 
Sweden         20 -0.0210 -0.0646 -0.0152 -0.0454***  0.0265 -0.120 -0.023 5.714 
UK         20 -0.0647*** -0.0860** -0.0198 -0.0077 -0.0107 -0.189 -0.111 2.921 
USA         20 -0.0137 -0.0299* -0.0319*** -0.0023  0.0004 -0.077 -0.067** 5.620 
No. negative point 
estimates    16  12  12  12   9 
 
     13 
 
 14 
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Table 7b – Individual Country Results  
 
  
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 
RATIOS 
N 
 
unemployment 
compensation 
health 
age related 
benefits 
incapacity 
related 
benefits 
        sick  
pay 
sum of 
separately estd 
coefs. 
columns 1-5 
estimates 
using  
aggregate of 
columns 1-5 
ratio  
column 6 to 
column 1 
Australia       20 -0.0733*** -0.0317 -0.0276  0.0020 -0.0103 -0.141 -0.093 1.924 
Belgium         20 -0.0862*** -0.0211 -0.0642 -0.0310*  0.0232 -0.179 -0.215 2.077 
Canada         20 -0.1170*** -0.0803*** -0.0425*** -0.0116*** -0.0002 -0.252 -0.251*** 2.154 
Denmark         20 -0.1600*** -0.0533* -0.0160 -0.0070  0.0323 -0.204 -0.207* 1.275 
Finland         20 -0.1270*** -0.0265 -0.1170*** -0.0496*** -0.0301** -0.350 -0.322*** 2.756 
France         15 -0.1020** -0.0734 -0.1310** -0.0064  0.0073 -0.306 -0.315** 3.000 
Germany 20 -0.0918***  0.0605 -0.0541** -0.0116  0.0059 -0.091 -0.0799 0.991 
Ireland         15 -0.0715** -0.0657** -0.0827** -0.0094* -0.0261 -0.255 -0.190** 3.566 
Italy         20 -0.0812*** -0.0352 -0.1740*** -0.0121  0.0060 -0.297 -0.325** 3.658 
Japan         20 -0.0034 -0.0513*** -0.0599*** -0.0035*** -0.0010** -0.119 -0.127*** 35.000 
Netherlands         20 -0.1200*** -0.0664 -0.0308 -0.0017  0.0438 -0.175 -0.286* 1.458 
Portugal 19 -0.0257**  0.0505 -0.0192  0.0183  0.0085**   0.032 -0.003 -1.245 
Spain         20 -0.0725  0.0662 -0.0822** -0.0061  0.0052 -0.089 -0.240 1.228 
Sweden         20 -0.1250*** -0.0497* -0.1170*** -0.0695***  0.0925* -0.269 -0.296*** 2.152 
UK         20 -0.0813*** -0.1130*** -0.1340* -0.0388**  0.0092 -0.358 -0.320*** 4.403 
USA         20 -0.0194 -0.0617*** -0.0857*** -0.0070* -0.0023 -0.176 -0.187*** 9.072 
No. negative point 
estimates    16  13  16  16   6 
 
     16 
 
 16 
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TEST APPENDIX: Table A1a  - Sequentially dropping individual countries 
 
3SLS 
Levels 
Household 
Direct Taxes 
Other 
Direct Taxes 
Social 
Security 
Contribu-
tions 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Expenditure 
n.e.s 
Health 
Expenditure 
Age Related 
Expenditure 
Incapacity 
Related 
Benefits 
Unemploy-
ment Com-
pensation 
Sick Pay Subsidies 
All  0.300*** 0.156*** 0.0445*** 0.0141   -0.0104 -0.0437*** -0.0451*** -0.0150*** -0.0407*** -0.0019 -0.0314***
Australia    0.305*** 0.155*** 0.0456*** 0.0137 -0.0065 -0.0424*** -0.0400*** -0.0148*** -0.0408*** -0.0022 -0.0315***
Austria    0.300*** 0.154*** 0.0440*** 0.0129 -0.0092 -0.0438*** -0.0453*** -0.0149*** -0.0405*** -0.0020 -0.0313***
Belgium    0.300*** 0.155*** 0.0443*** 0.0141 -0.0082 -0.0437*** -0.0456*** -0.0151*** -0.0402*** -0.0021 -0.0314***
Canada    0.287*** 0.154*** 0.0478*** 0.0132 -0.0150 -0.0454*** -0.0472*** -0.0140*** -0.0386*** -0.0003 -0.0310***
Denmark    0.291*** 0.151*** 0.0367*** 0.0193 -0.0190 -0.0446*** -0.0392*** -0.0140*** -0.0445*** -0.0006 -0.0287***
Finland    0.299*** 0.153*** 0.0452*** 0.0130 -0.0062 -0.0448*** -0.0459*** -0.0152*** -0.0398*** -0.0026 -0.0310***
France    0.294*** 0.155*** 0.0475*** 0.0154  0.0004 -0.0442*** -0.0423*** -0.0148*** -0.0398*** -0.0016 -0.0300***
Germany    0.297*** 0.155*** 0.0492*** 0.0155  0.0181 -0.0416*** -0.0470*** -0.0133*** -0.0393*** -0.0022 -0.0339***
Iceland    0.293*** 0.159*** 0.0457*** 0.0184 -0.0070 -0.0436*** -0.0463*** -0.0142*** -0.0410*** -0.0016 -0.0311***
Ireland    0.300*** 0.155*** 0.0448*** 0.0139 -0.0053 -0.0431*** -0.0451*** -0.0149*** -0.0402*** -0.0019 -0.0314***
Italy    0.303*** 0.157*** 0.0436*** 0.0193 -0.0183 -0.0447*** -0.0403*** -0.0148*** -0.0403*** -0.0021 -0.0312***
Netherlands    0.300*** 0.156*** 0.0445*** 0.0141 -0.0104 -0.0437*** -0.0451*** -0.0150*** -0.0407*** -0.0019 -0.0314***
NewZealand    0.299*** 0.156*** 0.0446*** 0.0143 -0.0078 -0.0432*** -0.0445*** -0.0157*** -0.0399*** -0.0021 -0.0321***
Norway    0.299*** 0.156*** 0.0452*** 0.0131 -0.0087 -0.0431*** -0.0448*** -0.0148*** -0.0398*** -0.0020 -0.0312***
Portugal    0.261*** 0.176*** 0.0347*** 0.00881 -0.0090 -0.0434*** -0.0432*** -0.0127*** -0.0374*** -0.0008 -0.0308***
Spain    0.291*** 0.163*** 0.0459*** 0.0209 -0.0184 -0.0432*** -0.0443*** -0.0148*** -0.0411*** -0.0017 -0.0314***
Sweden    0.298*** 0.159*** 0.0415*** 0.0133 -0.0053 -0.0439*** -0.0454*** -0.0150*** -0.0398*** -0.0017 -0.0311***
Switzerland  0.272*** 0.157*** 0.0345*** 0.0225** -0.0114 -0.0422*** -0.0423*** -0.0103*** -0.0340*** -0.0047** -0.0151***
UK    0.300*** 0.155*** 0.0441*** 0.0144 -0.0078 -0.0435*** -0.0450*** -0.0150*** -0.0410*** -0.0020 -0.0313***
USA    0.289*** 0.170*** 0.0386*** 0.0139 -0.0071 -0.0470*** -0.0478*** -0.0160*** -0.0390*** -0.0007 -0.0304***
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Table A1b  - Sequentially dropping individual countries 
 
 
3SLS 
Ratios 
Household 
Direct Taxes 
Other 
Direct Taxes 
Social 
Security 
Contribu-
tions 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Expenditure 
n.e.s 
Health 
Expenditure 
Age Related 
Expenditure 
Incapacity 
Related 
Benefits 
Unemploy-
ment Com-
pensation 
Sick Pay Subsidies 
All      -0.0396 -0.0037 -0.0350 -0.0072 -0.139*** -0.0549*** -0.0797*** -0.0264*** -0.0486*** -0.0151** -0.0265**
Australia     -0.0305 -0.0078 -0.0225 -0.0177 -0.158*** -0.0500*** -0.0892*** -0.0313*** -0.0496*** -0.0166*** -0.0319***
Austria     -0.0441 -0.0020 -0.0363 -0.0082 -0.129*** -0.0527*** -0.0782*** -0.0257*** -0.0473*** -0.0155** -0.0261**
Belgium     -0.0132  0.0062 -0.0296 -0.0134 -0.122*** -0.0570*** -0.0869*** -0.0260*** -0.0486*** -0.0157*** -0.0299**
Canada     -0.0289 -0.0075 -0.0393 -0.0036 -0.121*** -0.0547*** -0.0824*** -0.0287*** -0.0474*** -0.0165*** -0.0305**
Denmark    -0.0314  0.0032 -0.0416* -0.0069 -0.136*** -0.0604*** -0.0786*** -0.0289*** -0.0532*** -0.0119** -0.0150 
Finland    -0.0582* -0.0301 -0.0261 -0.0199 -0.152*** -0.0450*** -0.0766*** -0.0224*** -0.0460*** -0.0153** -0.0115 
France    -0.062** -0.0043 -0.0219  0.0050 -0.152*** -0.0557*** -0.0756*** -0.0277*** -0.0542*** -0.0165*** -0.0244**
Germany     -0.0473 -0.0018 -0.0326 -0.0092 -0.138*** -0.0515*** -0.0787*** -0.0249*** -0.0446*** -0.0136** -0.0230**
Iceland     -0.0463  0.0041 -0.0377 -0.0191 -0.139*** -0.0601*** -0.0800*** -0.0264*** -0.0542*** -0.0164*** -0.0294**
Ireland    -0.0398  0.0007 -0.0436* -0.0066 -0.132*** -0.0539*** -0.0778*** -0.0243*** -0.0485*** -0.0106* -0.0298***
Italy     -0.0377 -0.0182 -0.0350 -0.0032 -0.147*** -0.0572*** -0.0760*** -0.0259*** -0.0482*** -0.0125** -0.0262**
Netherlands     -0.0396 -0.0037 -0.0350 -0.0072 -0.139*** -0.0549*** -0.0797*** -0.0264*** -0.0486*** -0.0151** -0.0265**
NewZealand     -0.0445 -0.0090 -0.0279 -0.0249 -0.140*** -0.0532*** -0.0720*** -0.0240*** -0.0510*** -0.0121** -0.0275**
Norway     -0.0388  0.0038 -0.0288 -0.0061 -0.109*** -0.0560*** -0.0694*** -0.0214*** -0.0427*** -0.0168*** -0.0229*
Portugal     -0.0493  0.0443* -0.0375 -0.0205 -0.163*** -0.0501*** -0.0721*** -0.0174*** -0.0499*** -0.0068 -0.0461***
Spain     -0.0367  0.0033 -0.0431 -0.0183 -0.151*** -0.0593*** -0.106*** -0.0376*** -0.0465*** -0.0210*** -0.0203 
Sweden     -0.0183 -0.0066 -0.0348 -0.0152 -0.131*** -0.0537*** -0.0741*** -0.0285*** -0.0448*** -0.0136** -0.0233**
Switzerland   -0.0472  0.0047 -0.0436**  0.0054 -0.136*** -0.0520*** -0.0773*** -0.0264*** -0.0480*** -0.0117** -0.0266**
UK     -0.0387 -0.0017 -0.0344 -0.0087 -0.135*** -0.0557*** -0.0764*** -0.0264*** -0.0467*** -0.0158*** -0.0264**
USA     -0.0389  0.0032 -0.0253 -0.0158 -0.138*** -0.0529*** -0.0768*** -0.0302*** -0.0497*** -0.0178*** -0.0330***
DATA APPENDIX 
Code Description Source 
GDP Gross Domestic Product (Market prices), Value Economic Outlook 
GDPTR Potential Output, Total Economy, Current Prices Economic Outlook 
GAP1 US Output GAP, EU12 Output Gap for US Economic Outlook 
PGDP GDP Deflator Economic Outlook 
INF PGDP Inflation Economic Outlook 
IRL Interest Rate, Long Term Economic Outlook 
UNR Unemployment Rate Economic Outlook 
YPGT Total Disbursements Government   Economic Outlook 
YPG Current Disbursements, Government Economic Outlook 
CGAA Government Consumption, Value Economic Outlook 
CGNW Government Consumption, Excluding Wages     Economic Outlook 
CGW Government Consumption, Wages Economic Outlook 
SSPG Social Benefits Paid by Government Economic Outlook 
PSE Public Social Expenditure SocX  
PCB Public cash benefits SocX  
PSE-PCB Benefits in Kind SocX 
Residual SSPG  PCB  
CAPOG Net Capital Outlays 
CAPOG = IGAA + TKPG  TKTRG - CKFG 
IGAA=Gross capital formation 
TKPG= net capital transfers paid + net 
acquisitions of non-produced non financial assets 
TKTRG=capital tax and transfer payments re-
ceived by government 
CKFG= consumption of fixed capital 
Economic Outlook 
HLTH Health Benefits in kind SocX 
YPEPG Property Income Paid by Government  Economic Outlook 
Code Description Source 
TOCP Other Current Transfers Paid by Government     Economic Outlook 
TSUB Subsidies Economic Outlook 
YRG Total Current Receipts Economic Outlook 
TYB Direct Taxes, Business  Economic Outlook 
TYH Direct Taxes, Households  Economic Outlook 
TIND Indirect Taxes   Economic Outlook 
SSRG Social Security Contributions Received by Gov-
ernment  
Economic Outlook 
TOCR Other Current Transfers Received by Government Economic Outlook 
YPERG Property Income Received by Government Economic Outlook 
   
AGE Age related Social Expenditure: 
= Old Age Cash Benefits excluding early retire-
ment pension [Code 100  Code 112] plus Survi-
vors Cash Benefits [Code 200] 
SocX 
   
ERP Old Age: Early retirement pension  [Code 112] SocX 
   
AGEI = AGE+ERP  
   
ERL Early retirement for labour market reasons  
[Code  712] 
SocX 
   
ICR Incapacity Benefits (Disability, Occupational 
injury and disease, excluding Sickness)  
[Code 300  Code 313  Code 314] 
SocX 
   
SIC Paid Sick Leave (occupational injury and disease 
and other sickness daily allowances)  
[Code 313 +Code 314] 
SocX 
   
UC Unemployment compensation / severance pay  
[Code 711] 
SocX 
   
OTH Other Social  = Family+Housing+Other Cash  
Benefits [Code 500+ Code 800 + Code 900] 
SocX 
Economic Outlook = OECD Economic Outlook  Database as provided on the OECD Com-
pendium CD Rom 2005 release 1. 
SocX = OECD Social Expenditure Database 2004 release.  
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